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Security is a fundamental issue for promising applications in a VANET. Designing a secure protocol for a VANET that
accommodates eﬃciency, privacy, and traceability is diﬃcult because of the contradictions between these qualities. In this paper,
we present a secure yet eﬃcient protocol for a VANET that satisfies these security requirements. Although much research has
attempted to address similar issues, we contend that our proposed protocol outperforms other proposals that have been advanced.
This claim is based on observations that show that the proposed protocol has such strengths as light computational load, eﬃcient
storage management, and dependability.
1. Introduction
We are evolving into a society with nearly constant access
to the Internet and its vast wealth of information. The key
driver of this evolution has been the desire for data sharing
through opportunistic contacts in collaborative networks. In
this opportunistic environment, the “always-on” assumption
is relaxed by allowing data transport even in the absence of
a contemporaneous end-to-end path between the source and
the destination. This paradigm is a radical departure from
the traditional end-to-end communication model pursued
in the Internet and falls in the general category of a delay-
tolerant network (DTN) [1]. This opportunistic network
is distributed and self-organizing in that the control and
management are largely up to the individual devices or users.
These devices and users are collaborative in the sense that
they cooperate to mutually benefit from one another’s role in
the network in order to maximize the network’s utility and
possibly to attain a common goal.
This evolution continues even today, and we have wit-
nessed the placement of ad hoc networks in a primary
position to represent an opportunistic collaborative net-
work. Forms of this emergent communication paradigm
are wide ranging and include low-cost Internet service
provision in remote, social-based networks to allow humans
to communicate without network infrastructure, pocket-
switched networks, underwater networks, or other situations
that impose gatekeepers. In particular, we are interested
in the vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). In a VANET,
vehicles ask to communicate with nearby vehicles with the
goal of propagating traﬃc-related information (referred to
as V2V communication) and also seek to communicate
with fixed roadside infrastructures (RSUs) as a way to
connect to outside networks such as the Internet (denoted
as V2I communication). VANETs are expected to greatly
enhance drivers’ safety and improve the eﬃciency with which
information on local traﬃc conditions is disseminated. How-
ever, the communication model for these versatile networks
is unprecedentedly unique compared with other popular
networks. Among these unique and challenging features
are rapid topological changes in combination with fast-
moving vehicles, frequent network fragmentation because
of sporadic connectivity, and a small eﬀective network
diameter. The latter is because fixed-in-place roadways force
the network to operate in an ad hoc manner and behave in
ways drastically diﬀerent from a generic ad hoc network such
as the mobile ad hoc network (MANET).
Because a VANET is a special implementation of an
opportunistic collaborative network, all VANET applications
rely on a trustworthy, secure, and collaborative network
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infrastructure to provide correct traﬃc and road system
data. Further, vehicles in the network are expected to behave
selflessly and beneficially with other vehicles. However,
these naive assumptions about infrastructure and user
behavior are diﬃcult to realize in such a highly dynamic
and mobile communication environment, and traditional
security frameworks are incapable of satisfying the volatile
security demands of VANET applications.
Designing a security mechanism for VANET applications
deployed in this insecure environment poses numerous
unique challenges. First, data and information in the network
must be shared eﬃciently and eﬀectively. Popular districts
or even busy streets may involve large numbers of vehicles;
the number of messages generated by requests or the need
for widespread message distribution can multiply the load of
the network far beyond the mere number of vehicles. Some
of these messages are so critical that authentication of the
sender and a check of message integrity are essential for road
safety. Cryptographic algorithms employed in authentication
and in the integrity check should be eﬀective enough to
reduce the overhead in vehicles as well as in a few trusted
authorities. The connectivity among vehicles can often be
highly transient or a one-time event. Delivering a message
may involve long delays of recurrent hops to establish a
path to a personal contact on the other side of a VANET
while at the same time trust gradually develops as a circle
of trusted acquaintances enlarges. Further, many of the
envisioned safety and driver-assistance applications pose
strict deadlines on their time-sensitive messages. Security
mechanisms must take this constraint of eﬃciency into
consideration.
The second challenge is to preserve privacy within a
secure network. Drivers and passengers value their privacy
and are unlikely to adopt applications that require them to
forfeit it. It is diﬃcult to satisfy simultaneously these security
and privacy challenges. In the course of authentication
for security, a vehicle broadcasts considerable information
related to its identity and location. Drivers and passengers
with malicious intent could take advantage of this freely
available information to record and trace individual vehicles.
On the other hand, if we attempt to make a vehicle
anonymous simply by assigning it a temporary identity, it
can only be tracked and recorded for the duration of this
assigned identity. Although an adversary might be unable
to link several temporary identities to a specific vehicle,
a potential side eﬀect of such anonymity might be less
reliable information because drivers might tend to spread
false messages when there is no risk of being caught.
The third challenge arises from those situations in which
drivers argue because of incorrect information broadcast
over the network, and an authority must arbitrate the
dispute. As far as privacy is concerned, authorities may not
be able to assign liability to a vehicle that diﬀuses bogus
messages if there is no link to the identity of the vehicle.
Accordingly, the degree of privacy available in a VANET
must be relaxed from stringent to conditional that user-
related private information must be protected while the
authorities should be able to reveal the identities of message
sender in order for the liability stands. In any case, safety
and the liability requirement it entails have top priority and
supersede the privacy requirement.
Our goal in this paper is to take significant steps toward
designing a security protocol for a VANET that satisfies these
three requirements. The issue of how to provide anonymous
yet traceable safety message authentication has become a
fundamental design requirement in a vehicular network. The
basic idea is to sign messages with ephemeral, anonymous,
and traceable identities for both network security and user
privacy. For eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency, we adopted proxy
signature cryptography [2, 3] to authenticate vehicles and
RSUs and directed the RSUs to issue short-lived certificates
only for authenticated vehicles. This issuance is authorized
by a trusted third party. To use storage eﬃciently in the
vehicle, the RSU maintains a list of revoked vehicles because
sometimes the size of this list can grow fairly large. Conse-
quently, mutual authentication between entities in a VANET
occurs quickly in the proposed protocol while imposing only
minimal additional overhead for management of these new
security infrastructures. This form of conditional privacy
is also supported with an ephemeral, anonymous, and
traceable identity.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold:
(1) We define the design requirements for a secure VANET
through analysis of the features, strengths, and weaknesses
of many security proposals. (2) We propose a protocol
for enhanced VANET security of communications not only
between vehicles but also between vehicles and RSUs. (3) We
evaluate the proposed protocol by measuring delays between
VANET components so as to compare the speed of the
proposed protocol with other proposals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we survey the features of many VANET security proposals.
In Section 3, we analyze, and then define, the system model
for a VANET. We also give a brief overview of the system
architecture of the proposed protocol. Section 4 details the
proposed security protocol for a VANET, followed by a
security analysis in Section 5. Section 6 analyzes the perfor-
mance of the proposed protocol in terms of computational
delay, communication delay, and storage overhead. Section 7
presents our conclusions.
2. Related Work
Messages in a VANET contain traﬃc-related safety infor-
mation, which makes it critical to preserve the accuracy
of messages. Message authentication has been suggested
as a way to ensure this accuracy. Historically, Public-Key
Infrastructure (PKI) has played a vital role in authenticating
such critical messages. Authenticity verification requires a
public key for the source and also a certificate of this public
key confirmed by the trusted authority (TA). A security
weakness begins with this publically available certificate,
which includes an owner’s ID that can be used to identify
vehicles. This disclosure of IDs oﬀers significant threats
to privacy in a VANET. The Message Authentication Code
(MAC) has been suggested as a promising alternative. This
new mechanism is based on symmetric-key cryptography.
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Although it dispenses with the need for the certificate, this
technique requires a preshared key that limits the scale of the
technique. Only a few studies have tackled VANET security
and privacy, despite the ultimate importance of these two
issues. Those studies that have approached these issues can be
categorized largely into three groups: (1) cryptographybased,
(2) groupingbased, and (3) unlinkabilitybased.
Fortunately, eﬃcient cryptography exists that can hide
the identity of the sender of a message. Group signature [4]
and blind signature [5] are examples of such cryptography.
Lin et al. proposed a protocol based on a group signature
[6]. Group Signature and Identity-based Signature (GSIS) is
the name of this protocol. Recipients can verify a message’s
signature with the group’s public key. If the signature is
authentic, the recipient can confirm that the sender is
a group member but cannot identify a specific person.
Although its dispensing with the certificate is considered a
GSIS advantage, the GSIS protocol adds a big computational
overhead through its requirement to maintain a revocation
list (RL). Zhang et al.’s protocol, called a Location Privacy
Preserving Authentication Scheme (LPPAS), adopts a blind
signature to protect VANET privacy [7]. This prevents
vehicles from tracking each other, but it also makes it all but
impossible to track faulty vehicles.
A grouping-based protocol has been proposed as a
complementary (not a substitute) approach to privacy
preservation. The key idea is to hide in a group a vehicle’s
explicit identity and location. This is a tradeoﬀ of privacy
preservation and information accuracy. In Zhang et al.’s
protocol [8], a group of k vehicles is formed, all with the
same identification. Nearby vehicles cannot tell a vehicle’s
real identity, only its group identity. Although aggregating
traﬃc-related messages significantly decreases computa-
tional overhead, this approach still leaves a lot of room for
improvement. Another grouping-based protocol proposed
by Sha et al. adopts an authentication algorithm called Group
ID-Tree [9]. In this protocol, a vehicle is able to connect to
the RSU after proving its membership in a group. Managing
group membership, however, leads to additional overhead
in this protocol. The protocol proposed by the authors of
[10] elects a group leader who then communicates with
the RSU on behalf of the group. This protocol also suﬀers
the disadvantage of the overhead associated with the RL
management required to authenticate group membership.
A solution suggested as a third approach breaks this link-
ability along with the messages. Because linkability is caused
by the same certificate being used repeatedly, the new
approach uses a concept of ephemeral in issuing identifica-
tions and certificates. This approach leaves the identification
in the message open to public access, but identifications,
the two messages from the same vehicle are diﬀerent. Raya
and Hubaux protocol, called Huge Anonymous Certifi-
cate (HAP), installs a large number of certificates—about
43,800—in advance and randomly selects one of them to
sign a message [11]. The authors of [12] proposed a protocol
similar to HAP, the exception being its use of a short-
lived anonymous certificate. Although these two protocols
are impressive in protecting privacy, the overhead associated
with storing certificates and revocation lists leaves room
for improvement. In [13], Zhang et al. proposed another
protocol for a VANET based on Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) cryptography [14]. A vehicle’s identification is set to
its public key, and the vehicle keeps changing its ID quickly
to avoid being tracked. To eﬃciently generate a private key
paired with the vehicle’s short-lived ID, the TA’s master
secret is distributed securely among vehicles and saved in
a tamper-proof device in each vehicle. This protocol is
regarded as making a huge step toward reducing overhead
in cryptographic operations. However, administrators are
unlikely to adopt systems that require them to abandon their
master keys. Lu et al.’s protocol, called Eﬃcient Conditional
Privacy Preservation Protocol (ECPP), sought to solve the
storage requirement by using the RSU tomanage the vehicle’s
certificate [15]. At the time of authentication, the RSU issues
only ephemeral certificates for valid vehicles, eliminating the
need for vehicles tomanage the certificates and RL. Our work
complements this ECCP work by providing another fully
designed protocol to furnish a secure VANET environment.
3. System Model
Some design decisions were made in the course of building
the system model. These decisions were made after taking
into consideration both practical implementation and per-
formance issues.
3.1. System Design Considerations. In V2I communication,
messages are vulnerable to interception and manipulation
by adversaries seeking to harm vehicles and networks. There
also is the possibility that adversaries may impersonate
the RSU to deliver wrong or false information to vehicles
to disrupt communication. Another risk is impersonation
of a legitimate vehicle as a means to access paid services
illegally. Mutual authentication is essential to ensure that
only authorized entities are allowed to access the network.
V2V communication contains such traﬃc-related infor-
mation as traﬃc conditions, road safety, local danger warn-
ings, and a vehicle’s own behavior (e.g., emergency braking).
Thus, the sharing of this information with other vehicles is
not a concern. However, because the information contains
safety-critical messages, an imposter could jeopardize both
vehicles and road safety. Whereas the confidentiality of mes-
sages may be relaxed in V2V communication, the integrity
of such messages remains essential. In addition, the source of
the information must be identified before it is made available
to the vehicles. This is because an integrity check can only
ensure that a message is intact, not that it is accurate. Source
authentication surely adds value to the protocol by elevating
the level of trustworthiness of the message.
Exchange of private information is hard to avoid in
the implementation of secure communications. Anonymity
would allow resolution of some of the tension between
authentication and privacy. This anonymity, however, should
be conditional, given that there are requests by authorities
and law enforcement that require that anonymity be over-
ridden. In a continuing sense, the real identity of a vehicle
should be traced and revealed by authorized personnel if the
source of information is demanded in a dispute.
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Figure 1: Vehicular network architecture.
A vehicle’s misbehavior can result in the TA revoking
its authorization to participate in the network. In order to
isolate vehicles whose participation has been banned, the TA
maintains a list of such vehicles and advertises the revocation
list (RL) periodically in the network. The management of the
RL is quite expensive in the context of the system operator.
A vehicle searches the RL to determine if the source of the
information is listed before using the traﬃc-related message.
A vehicle must either save the RL in its own storage or check
with other authorities. As the number of vehicles on the
RL increases, a vehicle incurs either storage or bandwidth
overhead.
3.2. Vehicular Network Architecture. Figure 1 illustrates the
vehicular network architecture, which consists of three net-
work entities: the TA, the immobile RSU at the roadside, and
a vehicle.
An RSU is a gateway to a VANET, connecting a vehicle
to the Internet. Traﬃc associated with V2I communication
must go through this gateway. The RSU assists the TA in
disputes in eﬃciently revoking vehicles and in tracking the
real ID of vehicles. RSUs can be assumed to have absolute
and relative locations that in most cases are fixed and thus
often known or can be inferred straightforwardly.
A vehicle is a subject of communication and periodically
broadcasts traﬃc-related messages of two kinds of infor-
mation: (1) the vehicle’s current condition, including its
geographical position, current time, direction of movement,
and speed; (2) traﬃc-related information such as traﬃc
conditions, road accidents, and unusual traﬃc events. Each
vehicle is equipped with a Global Positioning System (GPS).
This device provides accurate time and positioning informa-
tion to the vehicle.
A user can be the owner and/or the driver of the vehicle
or, in general, any passenger. The association of vehicles and
users is typically many-to-many; however, at each point in
time only one user can operate a vehicle. For the rest of this
discussion, we make the simplifying assumption that the user
is the vehicle operator. Also, we do not distinguish between
users and vehicles in any aspect of authentication. Vehicles
in this model are equipped with tamper-resistant trusted
components (TCs). The role of TCs is to protect the vehicle’s
cryptographic material and their use.
The TA generates cryptographic key materials for the
RSU and the vehicle and delivers these keys to them over
a secure channel. The TA also manages the list of vehicles
whose participation has been revoked, periodically updates
the list, and advertises the list to the network in order to
isolate vehicles on the list. If a message sent by a vehicle
creates a problem on the roadway, the TA is responsible for
tracing and identifying the source of the message to resolve
the dispute. We made two assumptions for the TA: (1) the TA
is trusted by all parties in the system and (2) secure channels
are established between the TA and RSUs and between the
TA and vehicles using the transport layer security (TLS)
protocol.
In reality, a VANET can have multiple regional TAs,
and each TA is responsible for a given region (e.g., state or
province). Other candidates for the TA role are automobile
manufacturers. In any of the two cases, the diﬀerent TAs
will have to be cross certified so that vehicles from diﬀerent
regions or diﬀerent manufacturers can authenticate each
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other. These regional TAs will share their public keys and
IDs with one another, and the size of a region is carefully
controlled so as to allocate to a TA a manageable number
of RSUs and vehicles. At the time of registration, a vehicle
receives that vehicle’s home TA public key and home ID in
its region. Authentication in a foreign TA can be done by
exchanging a vehicle’s home and foreign TA information. For
simplicity, we present a protocol that has only one TA in its
system.
3.3. Cryptography Model. Authenticating two parties must
have a channel to certify each party’s identity. The tradi-
tionally popular key exchange algorithm, Diﬃe-Hellman,
is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack because two
parties without any auxiliary channels cannot ascertain
each other’s identity. One of the popular forms of the
channel is a common trusted authority (TA); this TA brokers
authentication by certifying each party’s identity. Hence, it
requires that authentication be supported by at least three
entities in the network without any weaknesses associated
with this eﬀort.
In an opportunistic collaborative network, however, it
is hard to imagine that an on-line TA will be constantly
available. During a rush hour, the number of vehicles may
grow suddenly and quickly, generating numerous authenti-
cation requests to a few TAs. These TAs cannot respond in a
timely manner because both the system and communication
channels are overloaded. Hence, it is frequently impractical
for vehicles to interact directly with each such TA to gain
authentication.
Delegation of authorities has been suggested as a solution
to the intermittently available TA and the occurrence of a sin-
gle point of failure. A user (the delegator) grants some of her
capability to another user (the delegate) in such a way that
the delegate can act on behalf of the delegator. A receiver can
simultaneously verify both the delegator’s acknowledgement
and delegation. This concept of delegation is a common
practice in various circumstances and applications; examples
of the practice include distributed computing [16, 17], grid
computing [18], electronic commerce [19], and mobile
communications [20].
The main issue in delegation of authorities is the nature
of the credentials given to the delegate and how the delegate
can obtain these credentials. A delegator could enable a
delegate to act on her behalf by giving the delegate the
appropriate credentials (e.g., a password or a private key).
This simple approach has at least one significant weakness
It introduces an increased risk of the credentials being
compromised and abused. The more controlled approach
is delegation with warrant [21]; that is, the delegator issues
a temporary credential by signing her warrant with a
secret. The warrant may include a validity interval, a list of
identities which these credentials are entitled to, and/or other
restrictions imposed by the delegator.
We introduced this concept of delegation into our
framework by adopting a proxy signature. Vehicles and
RSUs implement the proxy signature as a way to receive the
TA’s credentials. These credentials are used to authenticate
vehicles and RSUs even if the TA is not available to assist
authentication. These credentials are ephemeral, so that
the vehicle and the RSU are responsible for renewing the
credential before its validity expires. The compromised
credentials are soon useless because of their temporary
nature. Because at any one time the authentication authority
of only a single TA is distributed to individual vehicles
and RSUs, the risk of failed authentication because a TA
is unavailable decreases substantially. At the same time, the
load imposed on each TA is lessened, even at peak periods.
4. Proposed Mechanism
Our proposed protocol consists of four phases: setup,
registration, V2I communication, and V2V communication.
Table 1 lists the notations used throughout this paper to
describe our proposed protocol.
4.1. System Setup Phase. The TA first generates a set of basic
parameters for cryptography that is, (q,G1,G2,GT , e,P1,P2).
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic additive groups and GT be a
cyclic multiplicative group of the same prime order q, that
is, |G1| = |G2| = |GT| = q. Let P1 be a generator of
G1, P2 a generator of G2, and e a bilinear map e : G2 ×
G2 → GT . The TA chooses the master key ∈ Z∗q , and
computes Y1 = sP1 ∈ G1 and Y2 = sP2 ∈ G2 as its
public keys. The TA also chooses three cryptographic hash
functions H1 : (0, 1)
∗ → Z∗q , H2 : (0, 1)∗ → G∗2 , H3 :
G∗T → (0, 1)∗. All public parameters published by the TA
are (q,G1,G2,GT , e,P1,P2,Y1,Y2,H1,H2,H3).
4.2. Registration Phase. The vehicle and the RSU are required
to register themselves with the TA in order to receive private
information for a proxy signature [22] and IBE cryptography
[14]. A vehicle receives two kinds of information from the
TA; pseudo-ID and the parameters required to implement
a proxy signature. The RSU also receives from the TA the
necessary parameters for the proxy signature and its private
key. In order to prevent a vehicle from impersonating the
RSU by using the TA’s delegation and vice versa, the vehicle
and the RSU are assigned to diﬀerent groups (e.g., G1 and
G2) in elliptic curve cryptography. This phase must precede
the deployment of a vehicle and RSU into communication.
The registration phase comprises two registrations for the
vehicle and RSU, respectively. Algorithm 1 elaborates the
registration procedure for the vehicle and RSU from the
perspective of the TA.
4.2.1. Vehicle Registration. Vehicle Vi sends its identity IDV
to the TA and negotiates with the TA for a proper delegated
period TExp for the proxy signature. Then, the TA performs
the following steps to generate proxy parameters for Vi.
(1) Generate pseudo-ID of Vi PIDV and set warrant
WV = (PIDV ,TExp).
(2) Choose a random number a1 ∈ Z∗q and compute a
delegated key pair (UV , σV ) as illustrated in (1).UV is
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Table 1: Notations and descriptions.
Notation Descriptions
G1,G2 Cyclic additive groups
GT A cyclic multiplicative group
P1,P2 Generators of the cyclic additive group G1,G2
s Master key of the TA
Y1 = sP1, Y2 = sP2 Public keys of the TA
e A bilinear map G2 ×G2 → GT
q The order of groups G1,G2, and GT
Wi Warrant of vehicle or RSU i
CERTi Short-lived anonymous certificate of vehicle i
di/Qi Private/public key of RSU i-based IBE
xi/Yi Short-lived private/public key of vehicle i
σi/Ui Delegated private/public key of vehicle or RSU i
SKi j Session key between vehicle i and RSU j
Data: Vehicle and RSU send their IDs to TA for registration
Result: Parameters for proxy signature
(1) begin
(2) If ID is vehicle’s then
(3) Choose pseudo ID PIDV
(4) SetWV = (PIDV ,TExp)
(5) Compute UV = H1(WV )P1 + a1P1 ∈ G1 and
σV = −sH1(UV )− a1 ∈ Z∗q
(6) Store the duplet (IDV , PIDV ,WV , σV )
(7) return (PIDV ,UV ,WV , σV )
(8) else if ID is RSU’s then
(9) SetWR = (IDR,TExp) and LIDR = (IDR,LR)
(10) Compute UR = H1(WR)P2 + a2P2 ∈ G2,
σR = −sH1(UR)− a2 ∈ Z∗q and
QR = H2(LIDR) ∈ G2 and dR = sQR ∈ G2
(11) Store (LIDR,WR,UR, σR)
(12) return (LIDR,WR,UR, σR,dR)
(13) end
(14) end
Algorithm 1: Registration from TA’s perspective.
a delegated public key, and σV is a delegated private
key
UV = H1(WV )P1 + a1P1 ∈ G1,
σV = −sH1(UV )− a1 ∈ Z∗q .
(1)
(3) Store duplet (IDV , PIDV ,WV , σV ) in the database for
future use.
(4) Return (UV , PIDV ,WV , σV ) to Vi through the secure
channel.
Vi accepts the delegated key pair (UV , σV ) if the following
equation holds. The vehicle’s delegated private key σV was
created by the TA using the TA’s master secret key s as follow:
H1(WV )P1 = σVP1 +H1(UV )Y1 +UV. (2)
Correctness of (2). A verifier can be assured validation of the
delegated key pair by confirming the inclusion of Y1 in the
equation.
σVP1 +H1(UV )Y1 +UV
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Table 2: Authentication and generation of short-lived anonymous certificate in V2I communication.
Vehicle Vi RSU Rj
(1)
M=(WV ,UV , r1P1, PIDV,YV ,TSV )
SignM ⇒ (K ,w) and
Encrypt M and (K ,w)⇒ (L, S) (L, S)
(2)
Decrypt (L, S) and verify (K ,w)
Compute session Key SKVR
Issue the CERTV
C, r2 Encrypt (r1,Tcert, CERTV ,TSR)⇒ C
(3)
Generate session key SKVR
Decrypt C with SKVR
Check r1 and verify CERTV
4.2.2. RSU Registration. At the outset, RSU Rj sends its
identity IDR and location information LR to the TA. The
TA selects a proper delegated period TExp for the proxy
signature and performs the following steps to generate proxy
parameters for Rj .
(1) Set warrant WR = (IDR,TExp) and location ID
LIDR = (IDR,LR), respectively.
(2) This step is very similar to the second step in vehicle
registration. The TA generates a delegated key pair
(UR, σR) for the RSU.
(3) Compute a public key QR = H2(LIDR) ∈ G2 and
private key dR = sQR ∈ G2 of the RSU based on IBE
cryptography.
(4) Store duplet (LIDR,WR,UR, σR).
(5) Return (LIDR,WR,UR, σR,dR) to Rj through the
secure channel.
Rj ’s verification for the delegated key pair (UR, σR) is the
same as the one in the vehicle. Extension to the RSU from
(2) should be straightforward.
4.3. V2I Communication Phase. Vi must be authenticated
by the RSU before any connection to the Internet occurs.
Further, in order to avoid counterfeit RSUs, Vi also must
authenticate the RSU. Once mutual authentication is suc-
cessful, the vehicle and RSU share a session key SKVR, and
vehicle Vi owns its own short-lived anonymous certificate.
The session key prevents messages transmitted between the
vehicle and the RSU from being disclosed to other vehicles.
The short-lived anonymous certificate notarizes Vi’s public
key to sign messages delivered in V2V communication.
Table 2 shows message exchanges for authentication and
generation of short-lived anonymous certificates in V2I
communication.
Step 1. When vehicleVi comes into communication range of
the RSURj ,Vi is able to acquire the identification ofRj (IDR)
from the RSU’s beacon message. This vehicle measures the
location information of Rj (LR) by using its GPS to generate
the location ID of Rj , LIDR = (IDR,LR) and compute the
public key of Rj , QR = H2(LIDR). Vi generates a random
number r1 ∈ Z∗q and computes r1P1 ∈ G1 for the selection
of a session key SKVR used in V2I communication. Vi also
selects a random number xV ∈ Z∗q for its short-lived private
key and a corresponding public key YV = xVP1 ∈ G1 for
signing messages in V2V communication. This short-lived
key pair is carefully designed to be only eﬀective in the region
between the current and next RSU. The vehicle forms a
message as shown in (4) by including parameters required
to authenticate the vehicle to the RSU
M = (WV ,UV , r1P1,YV ,TSV ),
M1 = (Wv ,TSv) ∈ Z∗q ,
M2 = (Uv , r1P1,Yv) ∈ G1.
(4)
TSV is a timestamp chosen by the vehicle to prevent this
message from being reused. This authentication message is
signed by the vehicle. Vi generates a random number k1 ∈
Z∗q and then signs the message with its delegated private
key σV based upon the proxy signature. The signature of the
messages is (K ,w), and (5) shows the computation of the
signature as follow:
K = k1P1 ∈ G1,
w = σV − k1H1(K‖M ) ∈ Z∗q .
(5)
Sending this signature in clear text subjects the vehicle to
disclosure of private information and provides an easy means
for location tracking. Hence, the authentication message and
its signature are encrypted with the RSU’s public key based
on IBE cryptography. Vi generates a second random number
k2 ∈ Z∗q , encrypts the message and its signature as shown in
(6), and sends encrypted message (L, S) to the RSU as follow:







S2 = (M2,K)⊕ wP1 ∈ G1,
S = (S1, S2).
(6)
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Step 2. The RSU decrypts the encrypted message from the
vehicle with its private key dR = sQR as shown in.
S1 ⊕H3(e(dR,L)) = (Wv ,TSv ,w) ∈ Z∗q ,
S2 ⊕ wP1 = (Uv , r1P1,Yv ,K) ∈ G1,
M = (Wv,Uv , r1P1,Yv ,TSv).
(7)
Subsequently, the RSU validates the expiration time in the
warrant and checks if PIDV is on the RL. If these two
verifications are successful, the RSU validates Vi ’s proxy
signature (K ,w) with the TA’s public key Y1 as shown
in.
wP1 +UV +H1(UV )Y1 +H1(K‖M )K = H1(WV )P1. (8)
Successful validation in (8) leads to authentication of the
vehicle by the RSU and then to generation of the short-lived
anonymous certificate for the vehicle’s short-lived public key
YV . The expiration time for this certificate TCert should be
chosen with great care. An optimal expiration time would
be when the vehicle comes within range of the next RSU.
In determining the expiration time, the RSU must consider
the distance to the next RSU in the vehicle’s direction
of travel, the number of vehicles on the road, driving
speed, and so on. To generate the short-lived anonymous
certificate, the RSU selects a random number n ∈ Z∗q
and computes three parameters c,N , and z, according
to (9). More specifically, (9) illustrates the RSU’s proxy
signature for a vehicle’s short-time public key YV and TCert
as follow:
c = H1(YV‖TCert ),
N = nP2 ∈ G2,
z = σR − nH1(N‖c ) ∈ Z∗q .
(9)
The short-lived anonymous certificate is set to CERTV =
((z‖N‖c),WR,UR). A set of parameters (WR, CERTV, SKVR,
PIDV) is saved in the RSU for the purpose of assisting the
TA in tracing the real identity of a vehicle. Note that this
certificate is signed by the RSU with the RSU’s delegated
private key σR on behalf of the TA. Note also that anyone can
validate this certificate with the TA’s public key Y2. Finally,
the RSU generates a random number r2 ∈ Z∗q and computes
the session key SKVR = r1r2P1 ∈ G1 for V2I communication.
Another authentication message is formed by the RSU with
the parameters of (r1P1,TCert, CERTV ,TSR) and sent, along
with the RSU’s contribution toward the session key r2, to the
vehicle after the encryption of the authentication message
with session key SKVR. TSR is another timestamp selected by
the RSU.
Correctness of (7) Consider that:
S1 ⊕H3(e(dR,L))


























= (Wv ,TSv ,w).
(10)
Correctness of (8). The RSU verifies the signature of message
M by confirming the inclusion of Y1 in the following
equation:
wP1 +UV +H1(UV )Y1 +H1(K‖M )K
= σVP1 − k1H1(K‖M )P1 +UV +H1(UV )Y1
+ k1H1(K‖M )P1
= σVP1 +UV +H1(UV )Y1




Step 3. The vehicle should be able to obtain the session key
by calculating SKVR = r1r2P1 ∈ G1. Further, the vehicle
should be able to decrypt the authentication message with
this session key. For authentication of the RSU, the vehicle
compares r1P1 in the decrypted authentication message with
r1P1 that has been known since Step 1. Given that these two
values are the same, the vehicle can now authenticate the
RSU. The vehicle computes (12) with the goal of validating
the eﬀectiveness of the short-lived anonymous certificate
given by the RSU. Because the TA’s public key is used in the
validation, if this equation holds, the vehicle can assure the
certificate as follows:
zP2 +UR +H1(UR)Y2 +H1(N‖c )N = H1(WR)P2. (12)
At this point mutual authentication between the vehicle and
RSU is successful, and messages in the V2I communication
are secured by the session key. The vehicle will repeat this
mutual authentication with the RSUs along the highway
route and update the short-lived anonymous certificate
frequently to mask its identity to other vehicles.
Note that the session key in the channel between the
vehicle and the RSU is created using the Elliptic Curve
Diﬃe-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm. A derivative of the key
generation mechanism based on Diﬃe-Hellman is subject
to a man-in-the-middle attack. However, because messages
related to the session key generation are encrypted and
signed, the proposed protocol is invulnerable to such attacks.
4.4. V2V Communication Phase. Traﬃc-related messages
need to be shared by as many vehicles as possible. The
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 9
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Architecture (ECDSA) [23]
is employed to sign messages in V2V communication. When
signing, the source vehicle uses its short-lived private key
xV . The verifying vehicle uses the source vehicle’s short-
lived public key YV , which is notarized by the short-lived
anonymous certificate CERTV .
Signing Messages. A vehicle generates a random number b ∈
Z∗q and computes B, r, and t, according to the following:.




r = xA mod q,
t = b−1(H1(INFO) + xV · r)mod q.
(13)
Traﬃc-related information is denoted as INFO, and its
signature is created using ECDSA is (r, t). The vehicle forms
a message as shown in (14) to broadcast the information.
Included are the information, its signature, the sending
vehicle’s public key, its expiration time, and the public key
certificate
M = [INFO‖(r, t)‖(YV ,TCert)‖CERTV ] (14)
Verifying Messages. When vehicles receive a broadcast mes-
sage, they verify it as follows.
(1) Check the valid period of CERTV . If it is overdue,
drop the message.
(2) Verify CERTV with the TA’s public key Y2 = sP2 ∈ G2
through (12) in V2I communication.
(3) Verify the signature by computing (15). If equation
x′A mod q = r holds, the traﬃc-related information
can be accepted
u1 = H1(M) · t−1 mod q,
u2 = r · t−1 mod q,









We subjected our proposed protocol to a security analysis.
We contend that our protocol supports all security require-
ments demanded for V2I and V2V communication.
5.1. Mutual Authentication. The vehicle’s delegated private
key σV was created with the TA’s master key, and the
vehicle sends a message requesting authentication after
signing the message with σV , based on a proxy signature.
The RSU may validate the signature with the TA’s public
key Y1. If the signature proves authentic, the RSU can
authenticate the vehicle. For authentication in the other
direction, the RSU proves knowledge of r1P1 in a message
requesting authentication (see the message in (4)). Note
that the message requesting authentication is encrypted with
the RSU’s IBE public key, QR = H2(LIDR) (refer to the
encryption in (6)). Only the RSUwith a valid IBE private key
dR = sQR can decrypt themessage. Because the TA creates the
RSU’s IBE private key, if the vehicle correctly confirms r1P1,
then the vehicle can safely authenticate the RSU.
5.2. Source Authentication. The vehicle attaches its public
key, signature, and certificate to all broadcast information
as shown in (14). Nearby vehicles use (12) to examine
the eﬀectiveness of the short-lived anonymous certificate
and then verify the signature with the sender’s short-lived
public key YV . If the test is successful, nearby vehicles can
confirm the source of the information because the certificate
is ultimately signed by the TA. This is true because the RSU
used the proxy signature to create the short-lived anonymous
certificate on behalf of the TA. Further, because the RSU
checks the TA’s RL before issuing the short-lived anonymous
certificate, nearby vehicles can be assured that the sending
vehicle is not among those on the list. Although revocation
is possible at any time, a vehicle’s certificate is updated
frequently because of its short lifetime. The vehicle renews
its certificate either on its timed expiration or on movement
to a new RSU region.
5.3. Anonymity. The vehicle generates a random identity
PIDV and uses this identity for future communication. Only
the TA can link the random identity of the vehicle to its
real identity. A vehicle’s real identify can be revealed upon
a request from authorities.
Nearby vehicles cannot recognize the identity of the
source because messages do not contain an identity. A
nearby vehicle may track the source vehicle by comparing the
vehicle’s public key and certificate. However, such keys and
certificates are renewed every time the vehicle comes within
range of a new RSU. Hence, the ability of other vehicles
to track a vehicle is possible only for a short period that
occurs in a small section near each RSU. Further, in case the
vehicle sends its PIDV to the RSU to request authentication,
this message requesting authentication is encrypted by the
RSU’s public key. An adversary has no way to acquire the
RSU’s private key, which was created by the TA by using its
master secret. Hence, a vehicle’s real and randomly assigned
identities are safe.
5.4. Movement Tracking Avoidance. An RSU generates short-
lived anonymous certificates without regard to a vehicle’s
real identity. This hidden identity prevents a communication
from disclosing a vehicle’s location. However, if a series
of RSUs are compromised, an adversary may be able to
track one vehicle through its temporary identity. Even then,
however, the vehicle’s real identity would never be revealed.
5.5. Data Confidentiality and Integrity. In V2I communica-
tion, the vehicle and the RSU share the session key SKVR
immediately after mutual authentication. Afterward, all
subsequent messages are encrypted with the session key
for confidentiality and appended by the Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC) for message authentication. In V2V
communication, public traﬃc information does not require
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encryption. However, because of the importance of this
traﬃc information to safety, authentication is required to
prevent manipulation and tampering that might jeopardize
drivers. A vehicle signs messages with a short-lived private
key xV , as shown in (13). Nearby vehicles can verify these
messages through the sending vehicle’s short-lived public key
YV , which is certified by anonymous certificate CERTV . (15)
illustrates message verification with the short-lived public
key.
5.6. Prevention of an RSU Replication Attack. When a
vehicle sends V2I messages before the session key is set,
the vehicle encrypts the message with the RSU’s public
key QR = H2(LIDR). Because the encryption is based on
IBE cryptography, the RSU’s identification LIDR becomes
the public key. LIDR is the concatenation of IDR and LR,
where IDR is the real identity of a RSU, and LR is the
geographic location measured by the GPS. Once the RSU is
compromised and relocated, the RSU’s geographic location
would change and the RSU’s public key as understood by
vehicles also would change accordingly. In such a situation,
the RSU would not be able to decrypt the message and,
further, would not be able to respond to a vehicle’s requests.
As a result, this replication attack is no longer valid.
5.7. Prevention from Message Replay Attack. Timestamps
TSV and TSR are embedded for mutual authentication in
messages exchanged in V2I communication. If the time
information included in the timestamp of the message is
questionable, the vehicle and RSU will simply drop the
message. In terms of a continuum, V2V messages contain
traﬃc-related information, including the current time. By
checking whether a message arrives within the allowable time
window, a replay attack can be diagnosed and thwarted.
5.8. Tracking a Disputed Message. In the case of a disputed
message, warrant information can be found in the certificate,
WR = (IDR,TExp), and IDR can be used to identify which
RSU issued a specific certificate. In the corresponding RSU,
one can find a vehicle’s pseudo-ID PIDV in the tuple
of vehicle information, (WR, CERTV , SKVR, PIDV ). PIDV
is then sent to the TA to find the real identity of the
vehicle. The TA extracts IDV associated with PIDV from
the database, where another tuple of information is saved
(IDV , PIDV ,WV , σV ).
Table 3 compares the five protocols discussed earlier
in terms of their capability to fulfill security and privacy
requirements. Only the proposed protocol supports both V2I
and V2V communication in the VANET.
6. Performance Evaluation
We evaluated the performance of our proposed protocol with
respect to delays in mutual authentication in V2I communi-
cation and delays in signing and verifying messages in V2V
communication. After these measurements, we compared
the proposed protocol with other popular protocols in the
VANET with respect to the same metrics.
6.1. Delay in V2I Communication. Delay overhead in the
V2I communication comprises computational delay and
communication delay. The communication delay is by def-
inition the round-trip time (RTT) between communicating
entities. The computational delay in V2I communication
starts the moment a vehicle requests authentication from
the RSU and accumulates until the RSU returns the short-
lived anonymous certificate to the vehicle. Delay itself is
a function of many parameters in this measurement. In
particular, we are interested in measuring delay in the two
most influential parameters. These are the delay associated
with a point multiplication over an elliptic curve and the
delay of a pairing operation. Let us denote these two
types of delay as PM and PR, respectively. We adopted the
experiment used in [24], which observed the processing
time for PM and PR as measured in running on an Intel
Pentium IV 3.0GHZ machine. Our measurements showed
that single operations of PM and PR took about 0.6 and 4.5
milliseconds, respectively. We did not account for any other
operations, such as one-way hash, because processing time
for those operations, 2 microseconds, is so small as to be
negligible in the computation.
We compared the computational expenses for the three
protocols described in Section 2: ECPP [15], LPPAS [7],
and the proposed protocol. Because the number of messages
required to complete mutual authentication diﬀers from
protocol to protocol, we compared them in terms of the
computational expense in each message. Table 4 shows the
computational expense for each message up to the sixth
message. In order to distinguish operations in the vehicle, the
RSU and the TA, cells in the table have diﬀerent backgrounds.
The computational delays of LPPAS for the first twomessages
are left empty in Table 4. This is because these two messages
are formed without involving PM and PR operations.
Although ECPP and LPPAS comprise four and six
messages, respectively, the proposed protocol requires only
two messages to complete mutual authentication. Because
the proposed protocol requires fewer messages to complete
authentication, the delay associated with traveling between
its authentication entities is less.
Figure 2 shows the computational delays of the three
protocols in completing authentication (communication
delay is not included). The delay taken by each operation
as shown in Table 4 is modeled by its average value. The
delays of operations done by the three entities are summed
and plotted in Figure 2. It takes 15 milliseconds and 34.2
milliseconds, respectively, in the proposed protocol and in
ECPP. The proposed protocol is faster than ECPP because
it entails fewer messages and also because the protocol is
designed to use less expensive operations. The computational
delay of LPPAS in authentication is three milliseconds.
This is the fastest among the three protocols because the
protocol operates by dispensing with anonymous certificates.
However, the overall delay of LPPAS would exceed the other
two protocols because of its long communication delay.
LPPAS requires three round trips, but the proposed pro-
tocol and ECPP require only one and two round trips, re-
spectively, to complete authentication. The TA is not involved
in authentication in either the ECPP or the proposed
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Table 3: Comparison of the five protocols with respect to fulfillment of security and privacy requirements.
System requirements GSIS [6] LPPAS [7] HAP [11] ECPP [15] Our protocol
V2I
Mutual authentication X O X O O
Confidentiality and integrity X O X X O
Privacy X O X O O
V2V
Source authentication O X O O O
Providing message integrity O X O O O
Privacy O X O O O
Traceability O X O O O
Eﬃcient revocation X X X O O
Table 4: Computational expenses to form each message. The table shows the comparison for up to the sixth message. Although ECPP and
LPPAS need four and six messages, respectively, the proposed protocol requires only two messages to complete mutual authentication. Note
that cells in the table have diﬀerent backgrounds to distinguish the nodes in which these operations are computed. Single operations of PM
and PR took about 0.6 and 4.5 milliseconds, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6
ECPP 2PM∗ PR† PR + PM∗ 4PR + 9PM† — —
Our Protocol PR + 4PM∗ PR + 6PM† — — — —
LPPAS —∗ —† PR∗ 2PR‡ PR∗ PR‡
∗Vehicle. †RSU. ‡TA.


























Figure 2: Comparison of computational delays of the three
protocols. The delays in operation by the three entities are summed
and plotted.
protocol because the RSU is authorized to act as the TA.
On the other hand, authentication messages in LPPAS
must travel back and forth to the TA three times. In
general, the distance between an RSU and the TA is a
lot longer than the one between a vehicle and the RSU.
Moreover, the communication delay typically is greater than
the computational delay. ECPP and the proposed protocol
can authenticate quickly because neither requires travel to
the TA.
Figure 3 compares the overall delay of the three protocols
with respect to the RTT between a vehicle and an RSU. The
RTT varies from zero to 15 milliseconds. The RTT between
















RTT between vehicle and RSU (ms)
ECPP
LPPAS (α = 0.1)
LPPAS (α = 1)
LPPAS (α = 5)Our protocol
Figure 3: Delays of the three protocols with respect to the RTT
between a vehicle and the RSU. The RTT between the RSU and the
TA is determined by multiplication of α to RTT between the vehicle
and the RSU.
a RSU and a TA in LPPAS is determined by the multiplication
of α to the RTT between a vehicle and a RSU. The three
diﬀerent values of α for LPPAS are plotted in: 0.1, 1, and 5.
At short RTTs, LPPAS has the least overall delay. However,
as the RTT lengthens, the inversion of the delay among
the protocols occurs at points that include A, B, and C as
shown in Figure 3. For instance, at an RTT of 3 milliseconds
(marked as A), the LPPAS delay exceeds that of the proposed
protocol with α = 1. We speculate that 10 milliseconds is
a typical value of the RTT between a vehicle and an RSU.
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With this figure of 10 milliseconds, the proposed protocol is
the fastest of the three in terms of overall delay.
6.2. Delay in V2V Communication. We mainly use computa-
tional delay to compare the performance of the protocols in
V2V communication. Unlike V2I communication in which
messages in diﬀerent protocols may follow diﬀerent paths
and consequently create communication delays that diﬀer
significantly from protocol to protocol, the length of the
delay in V2V communication should be almost constant.
This is because messages are delivered among vehicles
irrespective of protocols. The computational delay in V2V
communication consists mostly of two operations that is,
signing and verifying traﬃc-related messages.
We have selected three other popular protocols in the
VANET for comparison of computational delays. The three
are ECPP [15], GSIS [6], and BLS [25, 26]. We did not
include LPPAS in this comparison because LPPAS does not
define V2V communication. Table 5 compares the computa-
tional delays of the four protocols. ECPP and the proposed
protocol must verify a certificate before the use of a public
key for signature verification. It takes 4 PM for certificate
verification and 2 PM for message verification, resulting in
a total of 6 PM for signature verification in the proposed
protocol. In ECPP, the same delay is required for certificate
verification, but the message verification takes 9 PM + 3 PR.
Group signature-based BLS and GSIS dispense with the
certificate because all groupmembers agree on the group key.
Consequently, these two can avoid the additional overhead
associated with certificate validation. It takes 8PM + 5PR
and 2PR, respectively, to verify a single message in GSIS and
BLS. In particular, BLS is quite eﬀective in verifying multiple
messages because of its capability for parallel verification.
Hence, while verifying a single message takes 2 PR, verifying
n messages takes (n + 1) PR. In contrast, ECPP, GSIS, and
the proposed protocol iterate one-message verification n
times for the same number of message verifications. BLS’s
advantage does not work for signing multiple messages, and
thus all of the four protocols should repeat a single message
signature n times.
The above discussion is illustrated in Figures 4 and
5 by depicting the comparison of delays in signing and
verifying messages, respectively, as the number of messages
increases. In signing n messages, as the number of messages
increases, the delay in GSIS increases more steeply than in
the other protocols (see Figure 4). In other words, these
protocols, except GSIS, perform very similarly in signing. In
verification, the proposed protocol is the fastest, with BLS
second (see Figure 5). Although BLS is eﬀective in verifying
multiple messages, the proposed protocol outperforms BLS
because of an eﬃcient design that employs less expensive
operations, that is, 6 PM versus 2 PR per message. The
operational delays in signing and verifying a message are
summed together and compared in Figure 6. The message
signing delays in ECPP, BLS, and the proposed protocol are
0.6 milliseconds. The proposed protocol and BLS require
3 and 9 milliseconds, respectively, to verify a message. The
delay in BLS is three times the delay of the proposed protocol.




































































Figure 5: Delay in verifying messages with respect to the number
of messages.
The robustness of the protocol—that is, its capability to
deliver traﬃc-related messages with unpredictable variations
in the network condition—represents another interesting
aspect of performance evaluation. According to the Dedi-
cated Short Range Communications (DSRCs) standard [27],
vehicles broadcast safety messages at intervals between 100
and 300 milliseconds. We drove vehicles that sent messages
at 300-millisecond intervals. As the number of vehicles and
messages increased, some protocols began to drop messages
because they were incapable of decrypting messages fast
enough. We want to compare the robustness of the protocols
by introducing a service rate, which is defined as a ratio of
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Table 5: Comparison of computational delays of the four protocols in signing messages and verifying signatures.
Signing a message Signing n messages Verifying a single signature Verifying n signatures
Our protocol PM nPM 6 PM 6nPM
ECPP PM nPM 11PM + 3PR 11nPM+ 3nPR
GSIS 9PM + 3PR 9nPM+ 3nPR 8PM + 5PR 8nPM+ 5nPR









































Figure 6: Comparison of computational delay to sign and verify a
message.
the number of deliveredmessages to the number of incoming
messages in a given time as follow:
Serivce Rate = The number of delivered messages
The number of incoming messages
. (16)
The higher the service rate, the more robust a protocol.
Further, the dynamics of group membership may aﬀect
the robustness of a protocol. Verification of a certificate for a
vehicle happens at the first introduction of this vehicle into
a network controlled by one RSU. The later verification can
be skipped after the first successful verification as long as
this vehicle stays within this network (of course, before the
timeout). Frequent changes in groupmembership may result
in vehicles verifying certificates of source vehicles for almost
all messages. This case can be observed typically at highway
interchanges and at the intersections of busy streets. On the
other hand, if the dynamics of membership change are rather
static, such as when a group of vehiclesmove in one direction
on a highway, the vehicles need only to verify certificates once
for each vehicle in the group regardless of the number of
messages.
Figures 7 and 8 compare the service rate of the four
protocols at 15 percent and 70 percent membership changes,
respectively, within a given time. As the number of vehicles
increases, the service rate begins to drop from one, despite
diﬀerent starting points, protocol by protocol. As group
membership changes more frequently (i.e., from 15 percent






















Number of vehicles in communication range
Figure 7: Comparison of service rates of four protocols with 15
percent of group membership changes.






















Number of vehicles in communication range
Figure 8: Comparison of service rates of four protocols with 70
percent of group membership changes.
to 70 percent), ECPP and the proposed protocol drop
messages for a smaller number of vehicles; for example,
190 vehicles for ECPP and 100 vehicles for the proposed
protocol. However, as for GSIS and BLS, which dispense with
the certificate, the service rates do not change significantly
as the percentage of membership changes. The service rate
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Table 6: Comparison of storage overhead in four protocols.
Our protocol ECPP GSIS HAP
Storage overhead — — n mn
for ECPP is higher than that of BLS in Figure 7. However,
in Figure 8, BLS’s service rate is higher than that of ECPP
because ECPP takes a significant amount of time to verify
certificates. In both figures, our proposed protocol scores the
highest service rate in terms of the total number of vehicles
served.
6.3. Storage Overhead in Vehicles. Table 6 shows a com-
parison of storage overhead in the four selected protocols.
They are ECPP, GSIS, HAP, and the proposed protocol.
Storage overhead is minimal in both ECPP and the proposed
protocol because a vehicle has no RL to maintain. An RSU
inquires of a TA, where the RL is actually maintained, to
check if a vehicle’s public key remains valid. An RSU then
creates short-lived anonymous certificates for only those
vehicles positively acknowledged by a TA. In GSIS, the size
of the storage increases linearly with the number of vehicles.
In HAP, each vehicle has multiple anonymous certificates.
If we denote the number of anonymous certificates in the
vehicle to m, then the size of the storage increases by mn
as the number of vehicles n increases. In addition, because
the RL must be updated periodically, traﬃc associated with
updating the RL may impose an additional type of overhead.
7. Conclusion
Securing a vehicular network is an ill-defined problem, and
most systems available for the VANET do not combine
eﬃciency, security, and traceability. They tend to do well
in one quality or two qualities, but not three. We initiated
our research in an eﬀort to determine whether a vehicular
network could be designed that would satisfy all three
qualities at the same time. The basic idea is to sign messages
with ephemeral, anonymous, and traceable identities for
network security. We adopted proxy signature cryptography
to authenticate vehicles and RSUs and to delegate the RSU to
issue short-lived certificates only for authenticated vehicles.
This issuance is authorized by the TA. To use storage
eﬃciently in the vehicle, the RSU maintains the RL on behalf
of vehicles. The experimental results demonstrated that even
within a harsh communication environment, our protocol
significantly improved the security, privacy, and eﬃciency of
a VANET.
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